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Analysis of the Liberian Ebola Survivors
Support System (ESSS)
Abstract
A systems theoretical analysis to capture the evolution and transition of the
network systems supporting Ebola survivors and their affected communities,
during the 2014-15 Ebola outbreak and recovery phases. The qualitative analysis
includes a literature review, archival review, and interviews with representatives of
key actors operating in strategic action fields. This paper uses a series of Diagrams
that visually illustrate the various complex phases and their network changes that
occurred and were established during the outbreak. This case analysis provides
crucial phase information that both captures the historical events that informed
the systems changes, including the development of the Ebola Survivors’ Support
System (ESSS). Secondly, this analysis acts as, a model of understanding how
disease support networks first emerge and can be better supported in other
outbreaks.
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Introduction
This research applies a systems theoretical analysis to capture
the evolution and transition of the network systems supporting
Ebola survivors and their affected communities, during the 201415 Ebola outbreak and recovery phases. The qualitative analysis
uses a series of Diagrams that visually illustrate the various
complex phases and their network changes that occurred and
were established during the outbreak. This case analysis provides
crucial phase information that both captures the historical events
that informed the systems changes, including the development
of the Ebola Survivors’ Support System (ESSS), and secondly, a
model of understanding how disease support networks first
emerge and can be better supported in other outbreaks.
With the increase of modern disease outbreaks like Ebola, public
systems are burdened to assist new afflicted populations neverbefore documented. These new affected populations provide
an often-unforeseen policy issue- tracking not only those who
become infected but disease survivor clusters to methodically
respond to their unique support needs after their discharge.
Systems theory literature offers solutions to this problem by
analyzing already-existing networks that developed to respond
to outbreak-affected populations. This literature further
demonstrates the importance of mapping the process by which
a network first develops and changes in the Complex Adaptive
System (CAS) of a crisis for future knowledge application. The
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2014/15 Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak in Liberia acts as a
vital case study in this endeavour.
Amid the West African Ebola response CAS, the Liberian Ebola
survivors’ support system (ESSS) eventually grew from an
emergent field of action into a legitimate network with improved
signals and boundaries over the course of the emergency.
However, this learning process was hindered by lack of previous
knowledge to inform its formation. There were previous Ebola
outbreaks but with little knowledge retention or guidance for key
actors about providing care for persons directly impacted by a
hemorrhagic disease. The Ebola response was ill-prepared for
the extent of survivors whose lives were left in pieces. The early
stages of the ESSS may be characterized as delayed, encumbered,
and at times inefficient at the expense of helping those most
affected by the outbreak. The state would later advocate for a
mainstreamed approach placing the ESSS as a leading facilitator
in partnership collaboration among fields.
This paper attempts to document for one of the first times a
disease survivors support system (DSSS) through a systems theory
approach. This analysis tracks the evolution of the Liberian ESSS
as a means of: 1) capturing its transition during different phases
of the response, 2) key issues, and 3) system structure changes,
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to serve as a guide for a more effective policy process during
future communicable disease outbreaks.

Methods
This qualitative research includes: 1) an initial literature review of
reports and articles covering the Liberian Ebola response including
World Health Organization (WHO) and Center for Disease Control
(CDC) situation reports and summary reports; 2) an archival review
of disaster response documentation collected during Phase 2-3 of
the outbreak, including Information Management (IMS) meeting
notes and reports; 3) firsthand experiences of two of the authors
who participated in relief efforts and led programming for Ebola
survivors and their families, including direct work with the ESSS;
and 4), interviews with various key representatives of strategic
action fields active in the outbreak. This work is in coordination
with Government of Liberia (GoL), with appreciation for the
Ministry of Gender Development and the Ministry of Health.
These two ministries have had multiple official titles, but for this
report they will be reference by simplified titles. Lastly, ministry
officials and external lead crisis responders later cross-verified
the draft of this analysis, providing feedback on the accuracy
of its information, findings, and conclusions. All feedback was
included in the modification of the final version.

Historical Documentation of Disease
Survivors Support Systems
The 2014/15 Ebola pandemic resulted in 28,616 cases, of which
approximately one-third were in Liberia [1]. Population data
collected during the outbreak was often inaccurate. Yet, it is
estimated that there are over 5,000 Liberians who were infected
with EVD and survived, later termed by the international health
community as Ebola survivors.
Since 1976, there had been over 35 known EVD outbreaks in the
world, mostly affecting sub-Saharan Africa with a survival rate
ranging from about 20-100%. While no previous outbreaks had
such a devastating toll as the 2014/15 crisis, numerous incidences
involved victims numbering in the hundreds [2]. A 2014 study
published in the Journal of the Royal Society Interface, “Global
Rise in Human Infectious Disease Outbreaks,” shows that since
1980, the number and frequency of global disease outbreaks
and their variety have continued to increase. An estimated 65%
of these contagions are zoonosis in nature like Ebola. Yet global
public health systems continue to lag in preparedness [3].
Most Ebola literature and response programming has mainly
focused on disease contract tracing, isolation, as well as treatment
and prevention efforts. Much less exists on mapping the network
support for surviving victims of the virus. Other deadly diseases
that are hemorrhagic or transmitted through bodily-fluids, such as
Lassa fever and HIV/AIDS, have better research informing how to
systematically respond to the needs of survivors or their households,
in what may be considered a disease survivor support system
(DSSS). However, this research developed slowly over decades after
the viruses appeared. It is well known that persons living with an
infectious, life-threatening disease frequently are affected beyond
the physical effects of their condition [4,5]. During an emergency,
these needs can be life altering.
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Phase Transitions - Fields and Interactions
Solé [6] demonstrates that phase transitions happen overtime
often through interactions among units that drive dynamic
change. The process of change of a network can advance within
a transforming complex adaptive system [7-9]. The Liberian EVD
response CAS demonstrated a substantial level of adaption and
learning during the first three phases of the crisis, which resulted
in the emergence and development of the ESSS. This change was
often activated through key governmental policy adoptions. The
system size depends on the number of different actors and how
they adapt to work better together as a continual learning process
[6]. This paper will explore the change of the ESSS throughout
these phases.

Phase 1: Initial outbreak
The theory of systems by Fligstein and McAdam [7] provides
insight into the social order that develops particularly in an
emergent system. Furthermore, Fligstein and McAdam present
a functional taxonomy for the different actors and fields in
operation in analyzing the ESSS, which will be applied frequently
within this analysis, including in the phase Diagrams. Throughout
the Liberian EVD crisis, a meso-level social order slowly was
constructed to support survivors, flocculating in size dependent on
the proximate fields operating within the response environment
at different times in the crisis. The initial outbreak phase of the
response (March to early August 2014) was obstructed by a
large diversity of agents attempting to respond to the growing
crisis with little knowledge or experience to guide them, often
operating independently with little collective action and weak
information sharing, as shown in Diagrams 1 and 1.1.

Actors
The Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MOH), under the
mandate of the Government of Liberia (GoL), played a crucial
mediation and governance role which better stabilized the
collective action of multiple survivor organizations, donors
and response agencies operating in Liberia around the peak
phase. Acting as internal governing unit (IGU) of multiple
fields overseeing compliance for entities operating in country
on tracking and prevention, treatment, and reintegration of
affected persons, the MoH along with lead partner agencies of
the Incidence Management System (IMS) enacted policies that
promoted the ESSS to become the strategic action field under
which all coordination efforts were to occur to aid survivors.
However, two exogenous shocks had to occur before this final
settlement could be reached in late 2014. The first shock was the
identification of patient zero within country, in March 2014, while
the second would be the August spike in disease incidences.
Early in the first phase, regional coordination response first
arose across the border of Guinea and Sierra Leone from Liberia
involving key international health agencies with similar niches in
disease response, including: the Center for Disease Control (CDC),
World Health Organization (WHO), and Médecins sans Frontières
MSF/Doctors without Borders, and the Red Cross [1,2,10]. These
international health agencies worked with Liberian agents
located on the ground; but mostly they operated in a consultative
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Diagram 1 Initial Outbreak Phase (March-July 2014).

Diagram 1.1 Mail Field Information Flow and Survivors.

role as a distant field of action (Diagram 1). International health
agencies like CDC began sending material and human resources
to Liberia, but communication systems were weak. While the UN
met with CDC/WHO, their coordination was minimal. The United
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
© Under License of Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License

(OCHA) was not activated which may have more quickly ramped
up emergency response coordination.
Additionally, many key international donors, United Nations (UN)
agencies like UNICEF and the UN Missions in Liberia (UNMIL), and

3

ARCHIVOS DE MEDICINA
Integrative Journal of Global Health
ISSN 1698-9465

national and international NGOs, and civil service organizations
operating in country to support post-war reconstruction and
peace-keeping efforts for over ten years found themselves
suddenly incapable to effectively aid the rapidly growing Ebola
response crisis. In a CAS, agents on the ground must ongoingly
adapt to changes in the environment to remain relevant [8,11].
Yet most of the development and peace-keeping agencies on the
ground instead acted as proximate fields resistant to adaption
from non-response programming to emergency response action.
They tended to view the outbreak as beyond their scope of work
or expertise. They instead quickly downsized operations and
restricted coordination efforts of their teams beyond the shared
boundaries of logistical coordination and resource support to the
state ministry agencies. Some would make the change.
Piketty [12] depicts how political and economic system influence
one another often represented in power dynamics between
actors and control of financial resourcing. Early in the crisis, the
state agencies frequently requested funding to expand response
services and administration. But, the low number of disease
incidents and redistribution of annual ministerial budgets to
public health coffers temporarily allowed the state to act more
autonomously in combating Ebola. For a time, the state agencies
were not reliant on extensive external funding by international
donors (now estimated at $155 million USD) as the cost of the
initial phase nationally was relatively low.

Key Issues
In these first chaotic months, persons who survived the disease
mostly went unnoticed, bleeding into the general emergency
landscape. The first interactions with survivors infrequently
occurred informally in person among key stakeholders: state
ministry agencies (MOH Ministry of Gender (MOG)), national
treatment response actors, and religious organizations, when
discharged survivors would return to Ebola Treatment Units
(ETUs) and government buildings pleading for support.
By August, the size of the public health sector was heavily depleted
of hundreds of frontline workers exposed to extremely high rates
of EVD infection, and both health workers and public servants
abandoning their posts to flee the crisis. There were not enough
volunteers and private health professionals to supplement the
growing number of open positions [13]. This decrease in human
resourcing weakened information tracking and system flows, as
knowledge management systems stalled. Liberian organizational
culture traditionally was hierarchical with command structured
centralized in ministry departments, which as Innes Booher [14]
show involve bureaucratic styling that could hamper normal
learning processes. Liberian state ministry agency communication
systems, often too outdated for timely communication required,
were increasingly stretched thin. Ministerial agencies relied on
past methods of communication sharing through scheduled
coordination meetings and formal printed letters/reports
delivered via messenger after rigorous administrative approval,
including multiple signoffs from departmental heads in the
central ministry and County Health Team (CHT) requiring hours
if not days. Agents within the National Treatment Response
shared a similar culture of communication as they comprised of
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mainly nationals including MOH staff. Yet foreign entities used
electronic methods (phone, internet) that were more familiar
and frequently circumvented ministry collaboration.
Information flows involving survivors occurred between fields
later in the first phase when professional actors more frequently
interacted with survivors (Diagram 1.1). Survivors were mainly
seeking funding support at first, due to their possessions being
destroyed during decontamination or stolen while in treatment,
as well as job loss due to stigma of their infection-status and the
crisis halting the economy [15]. They were also suffering extreme
psychological stress [16]. But there was no better-structured way
to communicate these needs (than by standing) outside of ETU
and ministry gates (flagging the attention of professionals walking
into the compounds and talking with them directly. Few survivors
had any other means of communicating with officials who could
help them). The growing number of survivors (from a few dozen
to 260 by late July) seeking personal meetings with profession
health and ministry workers led to the emergence of the ESSS,
and provided signals to common needs.

Transition of System Structure
The policy solution for the MOH was to authorize response
organizations to hire survivors as temporary paid volunteers,
working mostly in Ebola Treatments Units (ETUs) and quarantine
centers (ICCs/CCCs). The drivers for this transition were: 1) unique
human resource of persons who theoretically were immune
to supplement care for contagious patients; 2) motivation of
affecting positive change in the face of tragedy [17,18]. The
survivors represented a symbol of hope for despondent health
teams, particularly as the victim death rate lowered with improved
treatment, reenergizing the drive to collaborate on priorities.
Throughout the initial phase, communications between fields in
the response CAS remained weak. However, once the survivors’
plight was recognized and championed by key agencies, the
ESSS would act as one of the lynchpins that connected different
field agents under a shared common goal in the peak phase
of emergency. Yet, the ESSS remained an emergent field with
the only strong information flows occurring through standard
ministry response channels to proximate and distant fields of
action focused on tracking, treatment, and prevention; survivor
support information was carried secondarily (Diagram 1.1).

Ongoing Needs
Complicating matters, identifying and tracking survivors became
difficult as the number of victims rose towards the peak phase; an
untold number of  infected persons likely did not seek formal care
throughout the first phases of the crisis, and paper-based ETU
registries were filled with incomplete or false personal identifiable
information [19,20]. Survivors learned mostly through word of
mouth through small pockets of survivor support networks and
associates from ETU discharge about which officials to contact
by phone or visit in person to seek help [17]. Additionally, public
fear of survivors was amassing, as much of the population was
both ill-informed that survivors were still contagious as well as
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held traditional voodoo beliefs of diseases being a spiritual curse,
which heightened stigma and discriminatory acts against this
vulnerable population [16].

Phase 2: Peak
The second exogenous shock in the crisis was the August 2014
rapid spike in Ebola rates, led to strict border closures and media
attention, an increase in international response efforts, as well
as an eventual destabilization of the economy and infrastructure
capabilities of both the country and region. This exogeneous shock
shifted the political and financial dynamics of the response, which
as Piketty [12] shows, often fuels relational change between lead
actors. Dialogue facilitates negotiating access to need funding and
resources, yet there arise new issues of competition. Whereas the
Liberian state and national response team had been the primary
leaders with support from regional coordination response in the
early phase, the peak drove increased international support as
the crisis became a pandemic.
This shift drove a larger diversity of new response actors and
spurred many older agents in proximate and distant fields of
action to adapt their operations to join the response growing
from a handful of active NGOs to at one time 37 response
NGOs. Coordination between the national treatment response
and regional coordinated response overlapped tighter through
regional policies designed by international agencies and donors
in partnership with the West Africa contingency. However,
the influx of new international health actors and transitioning
nonprofits (NGOs) changed the power dynamic in terms of
human and financial resourcing of the distant and proximate
fields (Diagram 2). Feedback loops were poorly constructed, an
already inefficient information system was further constrained,
and most collaborative decisions and policies were rendered
ineffective [18]. As Page [9] demonstrates, too much diversity in
a system with limited common knowledge and agreement can
unbalance the systematic scales.
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Key Issues
Solé [6] explains that fluctuations in one system may lead to the
formation of a new system or revisions within it. Additionally,
the system size depends on the number of different actors and
how they adapt to work better together as a continual learning
process. Slowly, the size and scope of the response CAS grew
yet individual fields increasingly overlapped in effort, unified by
improved signals and boundaries, with the ESSS at the center of
this new wave of energy serving as a policy tool for improved
collaborative action. However, conflict and competition amongst
the different response fields injected divergence in the ESSS as
the crisis grew.
In August as the disease climbed to over 1,300 cases, the IMS
Committee Deputy Minister proposed to the MoH/IMS the
formation of the NESNL, which would be internally overseen
and maintained by MoH/IMS representatives and managed by
network team of Liberian health officials and survivor leaders.
The NESNL was one of multiple clusters which would later develop
as incumbents within the ESSS, yielding as Fligstein McAdam [7]
refer to as a disproportionate influence within the boundaries of
the strategic action fields.
For this project, the term cluster will represent the small groups
that developed first as pockets of survivors often who knew each
other from ETU treatment or within their communities, banding
together for solidarity and support, and eventually gained
some financial funding from different agencies such as religious
organizations, individual sponsors, civil society organizations, and
even larger donor or implementing agencies. Numerous bands
developed into or joined clusters as their contingency of informal
survivor membership grew. These clusters were often recognized
as representative bodies and allowed to speak on their behalf at
key response coordination meetings.
By November 2014, the MOH was recognizing the difficulty in
tracking and managing not only the enormous input of funding

Diagram 2 Peak Phase (August-December).
© Under License of Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License
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Diagram 2.1 Main Field Information Flow and Survivors before Mandate.

and agency activities to combat the disease, but also in working
with EVD survivors and vulnerable families. As shown in Diagram
2.1, communication chains changed and grew more complex,
often deviating from older response channels. Although the
IMS and the Ebola Emergency 311 Hotline were in place, they
were relatively new systems not experienced in country. Many
Peak Phase actions recommended by external partners like the
CDC/WHO and sanctioned by the state were strange concepts
to Liberian citizens requiring great adjustment, such as calling
for an ambulance or burial team to tend to victims. Some were
so culturally foreign (body burning, forced body removal and
forced quarantine) that they increased fear and distrust amongst
the population of new state and response CAS protocols. These
failures drove a political wedge between some in the state and the
incoming response agencies, but ministry leadership continued
further collaboration. Maintaining cooperation becomes
important in public policy issues when extreme emotion may
drive irrationality [21].
As the number of victims grew into the thousands, the number of
small pockets (clusters like the NESNL within the ESSS) supporting
survivors developed. They offered their members more than just
jobs but stipends (ranging from $100-450 USD/month) and nonfood items grew. In Phase 2, there were 9 identified ESSS clusters,
6 which were unregistered with the state [10]. Each cluster
(Diagram 2.1) was actively tracking survivors for membership,
soliciting organizations and donors for portions of the increased
funds and resources, and representing members’ issues in key
response coordination meetings. The MOH grew weary of its
inability to track actions between survivors and external partners.
The quality of information tracking worsened as these clusters
reported duplicate membership and used different tracking and
reporting systems.

6

Several clusters were also suspected of including ghost
membership, in which a number of listed member names may
be invented or include real persons falsifying their status to claim
emergency benefits. Ghost membership was a common issue of
corruption in Liberia since wartime, now repurposed into a new
form of fraud during the outbreak. Likewise, donors, eager to
allocate their funds, and implementers, under pressure to spend
grants quickly, frequently communicated with the ESSS through
new channels including private meetings, phone calls, and
even as abrasively as entering former hot zones and unloading
supplies directly in the affected households (HH), with no official
registries and without state guidance. These actions resulted in
poor distribution and power struggles that could not continue.

Transition of System Structure
By October 2014, the driver of change in the next phase
transition of the ESSS included: 1) controlling financial allocations
and resource distribution, and 2) improved communication
that increased accuracy of tracking and reporting mechanisms.
Towards the end of the Peak Phase and into the decline phase, the
state ministry agencies enacted a series of policies that revised
the interactions between old and new actors as they increasingly
transitioned into strategic action fields supporting survivors.
While these policies were often state imposed, they allowed
what Innes and Booher [14] refer to as collaborative rationality.
Firstly, in October 2014, all clusters or groups working with
survivors had to register with the state and submit all reports,
partnership agreements and membership lists or identified
survivor databases to the newly formed, joint MOH/MOG
division, associated with the IMS. Secondly, the state in its role
as the internal government unit (IGU) of the survivor network,
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facilitated the first national meeting of all identified survivors in
Monrovia on contact lists. In this large meeting with attendance
in the hundreds, survivors were asked to formally register with
the state to confirm their recovery-status under set protocol
including documentation, and to encourage their peers to do the
same, to be prioritized for benefits [21].
Next, two led survivor clusters, the Ebola Survivors’ Association
(ESA) and the MOH-supported National Ebola Survivors’
Network-Liberia (NESNL) were charged with taking the lead on
communicating these new policies, including traveling into rural
sectors. The NESNL had no resources, so the state supplied the
leadership with office space within the main MOH-IMS building,
as well as resources including computers and phones. With
the NESNL housed in the MOH, dialogue with state authorities
facilitated engagement and consensus for action, and served
as a direct communication tool that quickened decision-making
approval among key departments also set up in the main
building. The state also disbanded several fraudulent groups
posing as clusters. Additionally, another key policy stated that
all implementing agencies had to undergo state-led training
of protocol in working with vulnerable populations including
survivors and children [22].
The increased frequency of interactions with actors and the
state drove further dynamic change, measured in decrease of
conflicting survivor datasets and the establishment of a universal
registration toolset by December. Additionally, attendance in IMS
and key state-led coordination meetings grew which streamlined
information sharing, in which the ratio of meetings by those
with survivor issue minutes improved from about 1 per every 4
meetings in October to 4:4 by November [10].
Survivor input also expanded and permeated new fields through
participating in key strategic and coordination meetings. Likewise,
their voices became a universal symbol of overcoming Ebola
in distant fields; their testimonials were shared nationally and
internationally through social media and news outlets, promoted
by international actors in all fields including UN agencies like
UNICEF and the I Survived Ebola campaign, donors like USAID,
as well as INGOs like Save the Children and More than Me. Yet
the state struggled to track social media of survivor adults but
were more effective in protective regulations in stories involving
affected children. The media increased prioritization of survivor
funding and programs by donors and incoming or transitioning
NGOs in Phase 3.
These qualitative changes in the Peak Phase in communication
and information exchange helped solidify consensus for change
in a more democratic and systematic fashion. Secondly, it
reestablished the ministry agencies not only as IGU but in its
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traditional cultural role as managing authority, which was needed
to create improved field stability through setting signals and
boundaries reflected through protocol and policies that oriented
old and new agencies (Diagram 2.2). Set policies provided tags
for competing fields, particularly donors and international
health organizations/transitioned response NGOs, of acceptable
boundaries for actions involving survivors, and revised a new
shared culture amongst actors. For instance, the MOH began
regulating the range for one-time relief stipends and salary pay for
survivors that agencies allocated, initially raising the minimumwage and lowering high-payouts by specific agencies that were
causing disgruntlement amongst the ESSS.

Ongoing Needs
However, these boundaries were not always respected and the
communication remained weak between state and international
implementing partners, particularly in cases of high transition and
rapid employee turnover; many project managers and consultants
only were hired for short stints, and their replacements had to
re-orient to the system culture and operations. There was also
increasing external pressure by regional and international teams
to maintain strong budget expenditures, which could be stalled by
following state mandates. The more state compliance protocols
were established, the greater the bureaucratic inefficiencies. For
instance, a project manager may need to have Memorandums
of Understanding (MoUs) signed with multiple departments
in multiple state ministries, which was not conducive to timely
action in an every-changing emergency response cas. This was
one reason, a number of unauthorized communications and
partnerships continued even after state protocols were set. Table 1
demonstrates the key actors who acted as strategic action fields
(SAFs) interacting with survivors through the ESSS, their changing
level of communications, and the shifting power dynamics
between the actor and the state agencies (MOH/MOG) in terms
of policy protocol compliance and feedback loops.
Fraud and poor allocations of resources also continued through
the next phases of the emergency. Survivor clusters were also
identified later as still existing without proper registration, often
soliciting funding that could not be accounted for officially.
Moreover, competition continued to grow amongst the clusters
for funding for their members and their priority of needs, as well
as recognition and dominance within the ESSS. Some clusters
stopped complying with the MOH, such as no longer attending
mandated meetings, and operated independent of authorization.
This tension revealed a point of disagreement and the need for
new boundaries [14].
By December 2014, this ongoing gap in collaboration between
clusters signalled to the MOH and the Incident Management

Table 1 Summary of SAFs Interacting with ESSS and Power Dynamics with State Agencies.
Phase Transitions
1
2
3
Religious Organizations
*
***
***
National Health Treatment Response
*
***
***
Implementers-Transitioning INGOs and Health INGOs
**
***
Donors
*
***
Communication about ESSS- Low*; Medium**; High***; State Agency Adherence- Strong (Green); Weak (Yellow); Contentious (Red)
Key SAF

© Under License of Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License
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Diagram 2.2 Main Field Information Flow and Survivors after Mandate.

Team the need to impose a more authoritative transition. This
move was further advertised to entities through a series of
actions towards the end of Phase 2. Primarily, the November
2014 inauguration of the NESNL that included key actors like
UNICEF, as well as official newspaper coverage, demonstrated the
growing partnership transition between the state and this cluster
to dominate the rest of the crisis [23].

Decline Phase
Phase 3, the decline of the outbreak, experienced a shift in
the system fields. International donors and agencies fields
transitioned into large strategic fields that eventually outsized
both the fields of the state ministry agencies and national
treatment response. However, these four SAFs overlapped in
their coordination mainly through formal meetings established
through the IMS and coordinated email groups, co-led by the
GoL agencies, the US military, key UN agencies, and international
response agencies. The number of meetings drastically increased
as too did the number of agencies. Other additional meetings
were established by proximate fields of operations with national
and international operators, including by UN agencies like UNICEF.
These meetings had selective membership, such as between
mostly international agencies coordination and few ministry
representatives, often relating to niches of relief work efforts,
such as the management of ETUs, CCCs, or health infrastructure.
Divisions in UNMIL increasingly joined supporting Ebola, but it
remained mostly a distant field when it came to supporting
Ebola survivors. The regional coordinated response increasingly
overlapped as a proximate field with the main Liberian SAFs,
resulting from Liberia’s early peak phase. Lastly, the ESSS grew
in size and resourcing, while remaining strategically within close
coordination with the state ministry agencies, yet at the center
of where many SAFs and proximate fields overlapped through
coordination meetings. Thus, the visibility of the ESSS advanced.

8

Key Issues
International funding support for the crisis reached into the
billions of dollars. This pledge of aid helped shape a quickened
recovery; however, EVD rates had fallen significantly, most in
part to the learning and leadership of the original field actors
operating on the ground since the beginning of the outbreak.
Most particularly, under the command of the Executive, the MOH
and MOG joint effort provided rational and legitimate decision
making for state implementers, however depleting government
coffers. In Phase 3 (January-May 2015), the state became heavily
reliant on external sponsors for funding support, to build new
quarantine centers, fund ETUs, hire new staff and back-pay old
staff who had repeatedly worked without salary.
Innes and Booher [14] demonstrate how sponsors are crucial
for legitimacy, which provided a new challenge to the state for
maintaining its leadership. The MOH and MOG opened new or
more frequent dialogue through a series of continuous meetings
with key donor agencies, like USAID-DART/OFDA, EU, and
the African Development Bank (ADB), for improved collective
action. Donors double-checked that their funded implementers
frequently attended coordination meetings, as well as have all
MOUs approved by MOH and CHT leadership as part of auditing
procedure [20]. Other similar examples of collaboration happened
at top decision making levels and were enforced onto ground
operations. Work efforts and funding streams further aligned
towards a common vision set by the IMS members and the
government to start recovery efforts and stop pocket outbreaks
(Diagram 3.1). Most relevant to work involving survivors, the ESSS
was brought fully into the center of the key action fields through
crucial state policy mainstreaming the NESNL as the main source
of information flow (Diagram 3.1).
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Diagram 3.1 Main Field Information Flow and Survivors.

Transition of System Structure
Firstly, the NESNL became the umbrella body of all the survivors.
The state informed the other clusters like the ESA that they
would have to join the NESNL umbrella, following the elected
leadership of the network, or else disband. This created tension
amongst clusters, several groups vented their resistance through
national newspapers and advocated for partner support against
the mandate in response meetings [18]. At one point, confirmed
authorization was sent from the President to legitimize this
decision by the MOH-MOG. Small pockets of unauthorized
operations continued for a time, but eventually the government
halted them. Monthly ESSS meetings transitioned into NESNLfacilitated meetings where its membership continued to increase
beyond its original 1,500 members, and finalized a registry of over
5,000 identified survivors by May 2015 [19,20]. Furthermore,
these meetings were decentralized to county level with NESNL
again facilitating the communication process with MOH funding.
County subgroups were established under the NESNL for survivors
to join for a support network.
The central NESNL became permanently housed in the MOH
and closely collaborated with MOH-MOG authorities, including
providing update reports daily and provided ongoing space to share
key information on behalf of survivors with all actors in the IMS
and Response Pillar meetings. All communications were funneled
through the NESNL in established MOH/IMS communication
channels not increasingly providing tags to all response actors as well
as survivor membership. The NESNL increasingly used posts on its
Facebook page to reach current and potential members. By March
2015, they reported over 2,000 members.
Secondly, the social media and news campaigns championing
the stories of survivors dominated most outlets, and positioned
funding support for the ESSS as one of the key priorities for a
© Under License of Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License

few brief months in the third phase. The state ministry agencies
further compelled all implementers using these funds to help
survivors to submit budget and work plans to the NESNL not only
for approval that would be communicated back to the MOH, but
also to provide lists of survivors and affected families who were
confirmed victims and thus approved for resource support [23].
The NESNL collaborated with large implementers like the National
Institutes for Health (NIH), CDC/WHO, Academic Consortium to
Combat Ebola in Liberia (ACCEL), and UNICEF to establish large
scale programs with systematized operations for all registered
survivor members and their families to benefit from, including
free physical and mental health care, community awareness
building by CHT, recovery stipends, temporary jobs and vocational
training, and education grants [1,2,20,24]. Overtime, the decision
by the MOH/MOG developed the ESSS through the NESNL into a
uniformed body with a set boundaries and cultures of operations.
Contention continued within the ESSS as the NESNL formed it role
as the leading body. The main contention came from other large
clusters which were merging under the NESNL that their original
leadership have equitable chances at leadership positions within
the future NESNL. The purpose was to help democratically
represent the needs of their original membership now being
joined to the NESNL roster. These positions would play a vital role in
determining where, how and how much benefits and funding were
allocated among survivors and affected families. By May 2015, over
a dozen major organizations had reported to the MOH/MOG their
budgetary plans to distribute over $1 million USD alone in food and
non-food items (NFI) kits, vocational training, health and mental
services, volunteer stipend pay, etc.
As a result, the central NESNL management rose from 4 key staff
to the formal election of 7 stable central positions housed within
the MOH, and 66 delegates in 11 counties. The building blocks of
other MOH-supported networks were repurposed for the NESNL,
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including legal policies and MOUs, as well as the establishment
of an election commission for transparency, which ameliorated
contention amongst the clusters forced to come under the NESNL
and yet worried about equitable chances at having their leadership
voted into key positions.
As the third phase came to a close towards recovery efforts, the
repurposing of the NESNL as the singular representative body
moved the ESSS away from micro-perspectives that insularly
considered the short-term needs of the survivors and transitioned
the ESSS to expand its vision for a coordinated, unified effort in the
long-term. The NESNL measured more systematically within its
meetings and monthly surveys the common needs of the survivors,
siloed into key advocacy priorities. The NESNL further established
the first core mission and values of the ESSS, establishing itself as
a union-like agency for survivors and their families, receiving and
transmitting updated information through its communication
chains, and coordinating a more equitable distribution of benefits
for all members. By the recovery phase, the ESSS operations and set
protocols had all but eliminated discord amongst cluster incumbents
and reaffirmed the state ministries as lead facilitators in public and
private partnerships involving survivors and their families.
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In Liberia, this emerging system is effective in its capacity
beyond the short-term and mid-term goals of the response and
recovery, but may yield sustainable action in the government
policy to continue to support EVD survivors for years to come.
The NESNL continues to operate as a formal organization with
leadership staffed by the state. Budget constraints continually
plague the NESNL efforts to meet with survivors in decentralized
and centralized meetings. They currently utilize social media
and news to transmit key messages to members and their
families. The NESNL will need to rely on outside donor support
and implementer programs to address the changing needs of
survivors.

Conclusions

This national ESSS also plays a sustainable action role outside of
Liberia. The NESNL members travelled to Sierra Leone and Guinea
to train through knowledge sharing forming survivor support
systems that were not as advanced. NESNL leaders continue to
conduct trainings and advocate for survivors internationally. Yet,
the slow maturation of the Liberian ESSS serves as a reminder
of what could have been achieved had previously documented
systems informed its emergence. The question remains if the
ESSS could have transitioned between phases more quickly and
systematically with previous knowledge application from prior
outbreaks?

Current state of ESSS

Informing future disease survivor support systems

The ESSS as an emerging system played an increasingly important
facilitation role for helping survivors’ voices to be heard by key
actors in a variety of action fields throughout the crisis. “Inequity
is shaped by the way economic, social, and political actors view
what is just and what is not, as well as by the relative power
of those actors and the collective choices that result. It is the
joint product of all relevant actors combined” [12]. Over the
course of the crisis in Liberia, it primarily fell upon central state
ministry agencies to formally coordinate and set policies for the
ESSS to respond more systematically to the increasing need of
survivors and affected households. The state agencies faced an
ever-changing response CAS with a variety of actors, flocculating
communication chains, and resource and funding partnership
compliance issues. However, over the course of 16 months, the
priorities of survivors who were disproportionately affected by
the crisis took precedence amongst the multitude of actors who
joined efforts with MOH/IMS guidance. Because of this, the ESSS
gradually transitioned into a legitimate network, authorized by
the state as the official body or union for EVD-affected persons,
under the leadership of the NESNL.

An established DSSS body, such as the Ebola Survivors’ Network,
can serve multiple purposes. Examining the ESSS development,
the response system in the future can anticipate fields of
actions and potential partnerships at different phases within the
response.

The NESNL functioned as the umbrella organization that clusters
came under while still maintaining some autonomy as decentralized
groups so long as they reported directly to the NESNL and complied
with its mandates. Secondly, they had to report all identified
survivors to the IMS survivor registry and at-risk disease-affected
households, particularly vulnerable children, to the Division of Child
Protection. The formal transition continued to meet moments of
resistance from some clusters. Yet the policy process that led to the
restructuring of the ESSS into the NESNL provided notable change
in dynamics, and mainstreamed more effectual, timely information
sharing, partnership coordination, and collective action in an
equitable manner impacting more survivors.
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Documented action recommendations for future DSSS include:
•

When a disease first outbreaks, the state and key health
agencies most likely to interact with survivors should
allocate immediate funding and human resourcing for
the establishment of a formal body to track and organize
survivors. This action may include several parts: forming
primary leadership; a basic IMS system with track and
registry tools for the initial DSSS linked to communities
and ETUs/quarantine centers; clear assigned IGU roles of
specified ministerial departments to guide and coordinate
with the DSSS leadership. Diagram 4 demonstrates the
potential roles within an emerging DSSS structure.

•

The state can then negotiate with agencies transitioning
into strategic action fields, as well as with proximate fields,
the purpose and system of the DSSS, primarily to coordinate
allocation of initial investment and programming. Instead
of handling actual budgets, the alternative strategy is for
the DSSS to be trained to navigate external investments by
consulting on resourcing priorities and tracking equitable
distribution amongst identified and registered survivors,
as in the case of the NESNL.

•

Eventually, the DSSS (like the NESNL) may select to
transition into a lead representative body that provides
a safe space for sharing, advocates for survivors’ long-
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Diagram 4 DSSS Structure.

term recovery and reintegration, and consults on annual
prioritization of requested resources and programs,
as the needs of survivors change over time. This
transition should consider how leadership at central and
decentralized levels are selected, such as through voting
or merit-based hire by government agencies, as well
as the leadership’s individual roles and responsibilities,
reporting mechanisms, administration and budgeting, and
communication patterns with disease survivors, donors,
and implementing agencies.
•

Advocating for both state and international donors to
allocate annual funding for cost-efficient DSSS operations
within their budgets can sustain progress support over
time. This paper advocates for this prioritization of
continued funding for the NESNL by GoL and international
agencies, including USAID and WHO/CDC. The NESNL
serves not only the 5,000 identified survivors, but it may
also facilitate guiding support for the estimated 25,000
direct and indirect affected households in Liberian
communities that were former hot zones.

•

Additional funding for NESNL and future DSSS networks
can support regional partnerships between countries
affected by the outbreak as it transitions into a pandemic,
linking network cells together for knowledge sharing and
transnational coordination. These DSSS transnational
partnerships including collaboration between the Liberian
NESNL and emergent ESSS networks in Guinea and
Sierra Leone should be maintained for two reasons: the
likelihood of the disease reemerging is high following
current disease trends; and secondly, the negative impacts
of diseases like Ebola on affected persons and their
households continue long beyond the outbreak ends.
Stigma, income, and physical and mental health issues

© Under License of Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License

[16,19,25,26]. Regionally, there remain at least 10,000
survivors and their affected households and communities.
•

As a contingency plan, the ESSS leadership may act
as consultations on the startup of a DSSS in the case
of outbreaks involving new strains of EVD or other
communicable diseases. This role may include site travel
but only on a voluntary basis and under strict protection
protocols, as EVD survivors may not be immune to new
strains or diseases. Chronic diseases and contagious viruses
are on a steady rise globally [3], including Zika, Middle East
respiratory syndrome (MERS) and small resurgent pockets
of Ebola. In early 2017, a new Ebola outbreak occurred in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo with confirmed cases
and survivors of the disease. National and international
agencies must back public health systems to improve
the quality and frequency of knowledge application from
previous outbreaks. For the public health community, the
findings from the Ebola outbreak case which demonstrate
how response systems and survivor networks were set up
may be applied to a variety of different diseases and/or
disaster response situations. The foundational concepts
of the work outlined in this manuscript can be applicable
for response to public health and humanitarian efforts,
particularly in low resource, underserved settings.

•

The Liberian ESSS is a key case study of an emergent system
responding the needs of survivors and their families at the
meso-level, within the response cas. Sole [6] emphasizes
that while we cannot foresee the future, past experiences
can influence policy action. Modeling the process under
which a system undergoes can capture. The rate of change,
and political and cultural values that influence bonds [21].
By retaining core knowledge and training through the
NESNL leadership, and careful documentation of the ESSS
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phases, this system may serve as a learning tool informing
more effectual policy process for future outbreaks using
deconcentrated processes between the network and state
ministerial agencies. The ESSS offers a roadmap for an
effective DSSS, established prescriptively in anticipation
of needed survivor services rather than reactively as the
infection count grows.

Limitations
This research is a qualitative analysis which attempts to compile
a thorough timeline of the Liberian Ebola outbreak and recovery
at different phases. As previously mentioned, two of the authors
were actively involved in the response. One author helped in the
establishment and leads management of the ESSS throughout
its infancy into its current role at time of developing this work.
His first-hand knowledge and recount of the ESSS formation
serves as a body for this analysis. The other author worked as
an international technical adviser to the ESSS throughout Phases
2-3, and at different times worked as a consultant with some
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of the first programs utilizing Ebola survivors in ICCs, as well
as programs providing psychosocial support to survivors, their
families, and communities. Disaster responses provide challenges
to capturing timely, accurate data, as primary focus goes to
targeting and isolating the outbreak. Archival documents were a
challenging to find as there were limited knowledge management
systems in place during Phases 1-3. The authors specifically
triangulated collected information using various resources in
its literature review, archival review, and interviews to minimize
potential inaccuracies and perspective biases. The third author is
an expert in public health and infectious disease epidemiology.
This research recognizes that there are limitations in the
qualitative analysis, which would have been better accounted
if access to more complete IMS meeting notes and reports was
found, and more interviews with leaders of SAFs completed. As a
second measure for accuracy and transparency, the analysis was
provided to representatives at the Ministry of Gender and former
response coordinators working in proximity with the ESSS and
Ebola programming.
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